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AN UNEASY UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION IN WASHINGTON STATE 
Peter Dolan 
Abstract: Same-sex marriage promises to be one of the defining issues of the twenty-first 
century. While supporters of same-sex marriage have welcomed a shift in the public’s 
perception and increasing acceptance of same-sex marriage in the last decade, controversy 
remains over how to balance the competing rights between marriage equality and religious 
freedom. While most same-sex marriage statutes around the country include religious 
exemptions for religious officials, it is unclear how, or whether, these protections should 
extend to wedding service providers who have a religious objection to same-sex marriage. 
Conflicts between same-sex couples seeking wedding services and wedding service providers 
who have religious objections to same-sex marriage are inevitable, and despite the relatively 
recent legalization of same-sex marriage in Washington, such conflicts have already occurred 
and will undoubtedly continue to take place in the future. In order to balance these competing 
rights, this Comment argues that the Washington Legislature should adopt a “refuse and 
refer” method that allows wedding service providers with a religious objection to same-sex 
marriage, in limited circumstances, to decline to provide wedding services to same-sex 
couples. Such a solution would safeguard the dignitary interests of same-sex couples while 
also protecting wedding service providers with deep-seated religious objections to same-sex 
marriage from litigation for refusing to provide wedding services to same-sex couples. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 13, 2012, Washington Governor Christine Gregoire 
signed Senate Bill 6239 into law, legalizing same-sex marriage in 
Washington for the first time.1 A referendum challenge to the new law 
was launched almost immediately, giving Washington’s citizens an 
opportunity to decide the same-sex marriage question themselves by 
popular vote.2 Washington’s citizens exercised this right and approved 
1. Washington Governor Signs Gay Marriage Law, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2012, 10:20 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/us-gaymarriage-washington-
idUSTRE81C15L20120214; see also S.B. 6239, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6239.pdf (providing a 
copy of the bill passed by the Washington legislature to legalize same-sex marriage in Washington 
for the first time). 
2. Washington Voters Approve Gay Marriage, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012, 3:06 PM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019640072_apusgaymarriage4thldwritethru.html 
[hereinafter Washington Voters Approve Gay Marriage]. See also COMPLETE TEXT REFERENDUM 
MEASURE 74 (2012), available at https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/press_and_research/ 
PreviousElections/2012/General-Election/Documents/R-74_complete_text.pdf (last visited June 29, 
2013) (containing the actual language of Referendum 74). 
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Referendum 74 on November 6, 2012.3 Hard-fought by both sides of the 
same-sex marriage debate,4 the passage of Referendum 74 was by no 
means certain and was merely one step in the long journey of 
incorporating same-sex marriage into the laws and social mores of 
Washington’s residents. While proponents of same-sex marriage hailed 
the passage of Referendum 74 as a step in the direction of equality of 
marriage for all,5 those opposed to same-sex marriage now stand in the 
uncertain position of adapting to the reality of the legalized practice of 
same-sex marriage in Washington State. 
The issue of same-sex marriage is both politically and socially 
polarizing because it is so often closely tied to deeply-held personal 
convictions, beliefs, and principles. For many, “[t]he debate over same-
sex marriage has become for the twenty-first century what the abortion 
debate was for the twentieth century: a single, defining issue that divides 
the country in a zero-sum political battle.”6 As the battle lines between 
those who supported and opposed same-sex marriage during the 
Referendum 74 debate slowly dissolve, important issues still remain 
regarding the impact of same-sex marriage in Washington. One such 
issue is how far religious exemptions should extend for those who are 
morally opposed to same-sex marriage on the basis of their religious 
beliefs. Religious exemptions are a tool that can be used by a legislature 
to exempt certain groups from compliance with certain parts of a law, 
such as an exception for churches or religiously-affiliated hospitals that 
might otherwise be required to provide emergency contraceptives.7 
Washington’s Senate Bill 6239 lays out the religious exemption 
clause that the Washington Legislature included for same-sex 
marriages.8 Senate Bill 6239 provides: 
3.  COMPLETE TEXT REFERENDUM MEASURE, supra note 2; Washington Voters Approve Gay 
Marriage, supra note 2.  
4. Washington Approves Gay Marriage in Referendum 74 Vote (UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 7, 2012, 3:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/washington-referendum-74-
gay-marriage_n_2050539.html. 
5. Gay Couples Get Marriage Licenses in Washington State, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 12:29 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57557560/gay-couples-get-marriage-licenses-in-
washington-state/.12/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6239-S.SL.pdf. 
6. Jonathan Turley, Unholy Union: Same-Sex Marriage and the Use of Governmental Programs 
to Penalize Religious Groups with Unpopular Practices, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 59, 59 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
7. See, e.g., Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (providing 
a religious exemption for pharmacists who are morally opposed on religious grounds to stocking 
and dispensing emergency contraceptives).  
8. S.B. 6239, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/ 
billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6239.pdf. 
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No regularly licensed or ordained minister or any priest, imam, 
rabbi, or similar official of any religious organization is required 
to solemnize or recognize any marriage. A regularly licensed or 
ordained minister or priest, imam, rabbi, or similar official of 
any religious organization shall be immune from any civil claim 
or cause of action based on a refusal to solemnize or recognize 
any marriage under this section.9 
Despite this provision’s language that will protect religious officials 
from being required to officiate same-sex marriages, the Washington 
Legislature’s failure to protect anyone besides religious officials from 
potential lawsuits may lead to legal issues for wedding service providers 
with religious objections to same-sex marriage. 
While legal conflicts between same-sex couples and wedding service 
providers who object to same-sex marriage on religious grounds are just 
now beginning to emerge in Washington, similar conflicts have occurred 
in other states in recent years. For example, in 2006 a same-sex couple 
successfully sued a photographer in New Mexico who declined to take 
pictures of their commitment ceremony.10 In Elane Photography v. 
Willock,11 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the 
photographer’s refusal to photograph the same-sex couple’s commitment 
ceremony violated the New Mexico Human Rights Act, affirming the 
trial court’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment.12 Many conservative Americans opposed to same-sex 
marriage were concerned about the potential implications of this ruling, 
and the court’s decision became a rallying cry for efforts to overturn 
same-sex marriage statutes, or at least to strengthen the protections for 
those with sincere religious objections to same-sex marriage.13 
In January 2013, a situation similar to that in Elane Photography 
arose when the owners of the Sweet Cakes Bakery in Gresham, Oregon, 
declined to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding 
ceremony.14 The couple that owns the bakery contended that they acted 
9. Id.  
10. See generally Elane Photography v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (holding 
that Elane Photography’s refusal to photograph a lesbian commitment ceremony violated New 
Mexico’s Human Rights Act and that the defendant photographer’s constitutional and statutory 
rights to freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion were not violated).  
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 445. 
13. New Mexico’s Gay Marriage Lawsuit May End Couple’s Decade in Limbo, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 17, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-18/new-
mexico-gay-marriage-lawsuit-may-end-couple-s-decade-in-limbo.html. 
14. Gresham Bakery Says Oregon Constitution Protects Refusal of Same-sex Wedding Cake 
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within their rights under the Oregon State Constitution when they 
refused to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding.15 Article I, Section 3 of 
the Oregon State Constitution states that, “No law shall in any case 
whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religeous [sic] 
opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.”16 On August 13, 
2013, the lesbian couple that unsuccessfully tried to order a wedding 
cake from the bakery filed a complaint with the civil rights division of 
Oregon’s Bureau of Labor and Industries, which plans to move forward 
in investigating whether this constitutes a violation of the Oregon 
Equality Act.17 This is a good example of the type of issue that is 
becoming increasingly prevalent in a nation that contains people who 
hold genuine and heartfelt beliefs at either end of a politically-charged 
spectrum: that same-sex marriage is either natural and acceptable, or 
morally dubious. 
In light of this, the Washington Legislature should reconsider the 
religious exemption provisions in its new same-sex marriage law. These 
religious exemption protections should be balanced with the need to 
protect same-sex couples from undue discrimination and an effective 
status as second-class citizens. Professor Jonathan Turley noted, “I 
believe (and hope) that the nation will evolve toward a greater protection 
of homosexuals and greater recognition of civil unions. This evolution 
will not, however, occur if the government is viewed as unfairly trying 
to pre-determine the debate or harass one side.”18 Both sides of this 
debate have a concrete interest in finding a middle ground that both 
groups can find acceptable. 
This Comment begins by outlining the background of same-sex 
marriage laws at the federal level in Part I. Part II discusses the 
legalization and subsequent impact of same-sex marriage at the state 
level. Part III explains Washington State’s history with the issue of 
same-sex marriage and its process of legalizing same-sex marriage. 
Washington’s religious freedom protections are analyzed in Part IV to 
show procedurally how Washington courts treat a legal challenge on a 
Order, OREGON LIVE, http://www.oregonlive.com/gresham/index.ssf/2013/02/gresham_bakery_ 
says_oregon_con.html (last updated Feb. 13, 2013).  
15. Id. 
16. OR. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
17. Sweet Cakes by Melissa, Oregon Bakery, Under State Investigation for Anti-Gay 
Discrimination, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2013, 11:13 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/16/sweet-cakes-by-melissa-bakery-anti-gay-
discrimination_n_3767646.html; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.403 (2008). 
18. See Turley, supra note 6, at 75–76. 
 
                                                     
12 - Dolan Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  5:38 PM 
2013] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1123 
religious freedom issue. To provide an analogy to a similar issue, Part V 
demonstrates that the Washington Legislature was able to protect 
pharmacists with a religious objection to selling emergency 
contraceptives and could use a similar method in the context of same-sex 
marriage. This Comment then argues in Part VI that greater religious-
exemption protections will benefit both sides of the same-sex marriage 
debate and that the Washington Legislature should adopt a balancing test 
that allows independent business owners and individuals, in limited 
circumstances, to decline to perform wedding services for same-sex 
weddings when they deem those ceremonies to be against their religious 
beliefs. This Comment concludes by demonstrating why a compromise, 
which is by definition not ideal for either side, is nonetheless the best 
solution for the problems facing this state in a new age allowing same-
sex marriage. 
I.  THE FEDERAL DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT HAS BEEN 
RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
By July 2013, thirteen states had legalized same-sex marriage.19 The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
commented that, in light of the country as a whole, “[o]nly a handful of 
states have successfully passed legislation legalizing same-sex marriage, 
and only a few more have been required to afford equal marital rights to 
gay and lesbian individuals through judicial decisions.”20 In addition, as 
of 2012 “[t]hirty states [had] passed constitutional amendments banning 
same-sex marriage,”21 thus significantly limiting the reach of same-sex 
marriage in the United States, at least for the time being. At the federal 
level, same-sex marriage law was largely controlled by the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), passed by Congress in 1996, which prevented 
the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages and 
purported to allow each state to refuse recognition of same-sex 
marriages performed in other states.22 Perhaps most significantly, 
DOMA expressly defined marriage as a union between one man and one 
19. See Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ 
(last visited July 7, 2013). 
20. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
21. Id.  
22. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83 
(2013). 
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woman,23 thus precluding recognition of same-sex relationships at the 
federal level. 
On July 8, 2010, Massachusetts Federal District Court Judge Joseph 
Tauro held that the denial of federal rights and benefits to lawfully 
married Massachusetts same-sex couples was unconstitutional under the 
Tenth Amendment.24 The Tenth Amendment maintains that, “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to 
the people . . . .”25 This language has generally been interpreted to allow 
states to pass laws in areas that are not expressly delegated to the federal 
government.26 State legislation has traditionally included the area of 
marriage, and a study by The Christian Post, in June 2013, indicated that 
a majority of Americans support the idea of allowing states to decide on 
the issue of same-sex marriage themselves.27 
DOMA has been challenged in federal court on several occasions, and 
multiple courts have found it to be unconstitutional.28 In Windsor v. 
United States,29 the Second Circuit held that sexual orientation was a 
quasi-suspect classification deserving of intermediate scrutiny,30 which 
was sufficient to strike down Section 3 of DOMA31 as applied to the 
23. Id. 
24. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass. 
2010) (holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to challenge DOMA’s 
constitutionality, that DOMA exceeded Congress’s power under the Spending Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, and that DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment). 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
26. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 73 (D.D.C. 1979) (“Power is allocated 
among the federal government and the states by specifying those powers the Congress might 
exercise and by emphasizing in the tenth amendment that undelegated powers were reserved to the 
states or respectively to the people.”). 
27. Most Americans Say States Should Decide on Same-Sex Marriage, Poll Finds, CHRISTIAN 
POST (June 8, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/most-americans-say-states-
should-decide-on-same-sex-marriage-poll-finds-97588/. 
28. See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(holding that the appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classification based 
on sexual orientation was heightened scrutiny, that DOMA did not satisfy this heightened scrutiny, 
and that DOMA did not satisfy a rational basis test); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (2010) (holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had 
standing to challenge DOMA’s constitutionality, that DOMA exceeded Congress’ Spending Clause 
powers, and that DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment). 
29. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that Section 3 of 
DOMA is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff). 
30. Id. at 400. 
31. Section 3 of DOMA limited the definition of marriage to “a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife.” See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 
2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 
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plaintiff as unconstitutional.32 The United States Supreme Court agreed 
to grant review of the decision in Windsor and held that DOMA’s 
definition of marriage was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the 
personal liberties guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.33 The Court 
reasoned: 
DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal 
purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like 
governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, 
enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And DOMA 
contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of 
their State, but not other couples, of both rights and 
responsibilities.34 
The Court’s decision in Windsor opens the door for same-sex couples to 
receive benefits that have been denied to them because of the 
prohibitions contained in DOMA,35 and the Court’s decision will likely 
also strengthen calls for legalizing same-sex marriage in additional 
states.36 
In addition to Windsor, the Supreme Court recently considered the 
constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, which mandated that only 
marriages between a man and a woman were valid in California.37 In 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,38 the United States Supreme Court held that 
proponents of Proposition 8 did not have standing to appeal the district 
court’s order declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutional.39 In finding that 
the petitioners did not have standing, the Supreme Court effectively 
declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional without making its holding 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83 (2013). 
32. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
33. United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
34. Id. at 2694. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Hits High After Ruling, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 
10:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/01/poll-supreme-court-gay-
marriage-affirmative-action-voting-rights/2479541/ (stating that support for same-sex marriage in 
America has never been higher than after the approval of the two landmark Supreme Court same-
sex marriage cases in June 2013). A record 55% of Americans supported same-sex marriage at the 
time of the study. Id. 
37. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Proposition 
8 was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
38. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
39. Id. at 2668.  
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broad enough to affect other states.40 
II.  EACH STATE HAS THE POWER TO LEGALIZE SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 
While federal benefits for same-sex couples have been recognized as 
a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor,41 each state has 
historically had the power to decide on its own whether or not to legalize 
same-sex marriage, and Windsor allows each state to maintain that 
power.42 Massachusetts was the first state to recognize legal same-sex 
marriages with its landmark 2003 decision in Goodridge v. Department 
of Public Health.43 In reasoning its way to an approval of same-sex 
marriage, the court in Goodridge found that “[l]imiting the protections, 
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples 
violates the basic premises of individual liberty and equality under law 
protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.”44 This decision 
acknowledged the religious freedom issues that would likely follow, but 
did not directly address those issues, stating: 
We are mindful that our decision marks a change in the history 
of our marriage law. Many people hold deep-seated religious, 
moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to 
the union of one man and one woman, and that homosexual 
conduct is immoral. Many hold equally strong religious, moral, 
and ethical convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be 
married . . . . Neither view answers the question before us.45 
Other state supreme courts have followed the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts’ lead in holding that laws restricting marriage to 
heterosexual couples violate state constitutions. For example, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled in 2008 that laws restricting civil 
marriage to heterosexual couples violated same-sex couple’s equal 
protection rights under the Connecticut constitution.46 The Court 
40. Id.  
41. See United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675 (2013). 
42. Id. at 2692 (noting that “DOMA . . . departs from [the] history and tradition of reliance on 
state law to define marriage”). 
43. See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that, 
as a matter of first impression, the limitation of protections, benefits, and obligations of civil 
marriage to individuals of opposite sexes lacked rational basis and as such violated state 
constitutional equal protection privileges).  
44. Id. at 968.  
45. Id. at 948.  
46. See generally Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).  
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explained: 
Although we traditionally have viewed that right [to marriage] 
as limited to a union between a man and a woman, “if we have 
learned anything from the significant evolution in the prevailing 
societal views and official policies toward members of minority 
races and toward women over the past half-century, it is that 
even the most familiar and generally accepted of social practices 
and traditions often mask unfairness and inequality that 
frequently is not recognized or appreciated by those not directly 
harmed by those practices or traditions.”47 
An oft-cited case involving religious freedom and same-sex marriage 
at the state level is the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ decision in Elane 
Photography.48 In Elane Photography, the court found the defendant’s 
photography business liable under New Mexico’s Human Rights Act 
after the defendant refused to photograph a commitment ceremony for a 
lesbian couple.49 The court noted: 
The [New Mexico Human Rights Act] prohibits “any person in 
any public accommodation to make a distinction, directly or 
indirectly, in offering or refusing to offer its services . . . to any 
person because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, 
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, spousal affiliation[,] or 
physical or mental handicap.”50 
The court held that “Elane Photography’s refusal to photograph [the 
plaintiffs’] commitment ceremony violated the [New Mexico Human 
Rights Act]” and furthermore that “[i]n enforcing the [New Mexico 
Human Rights Act], the [New Mexico Human Rights Commission] and 
the district court did not violate Elane Photography’s constitutional and 
statutory rights based upon freedom of speech, freedom of expression, 
freedom of religion, and the [New Mexico Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act].”51 The New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari to review this case and oral arguments were heard on March 
11, 2013.52  
On August 22, 2013, the Supreme Court of New Mexico issued its 
decision in the case of Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock53 and found 
47. Id. at 481–82 (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008)). 
48. See generally Elane Photography v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
49. Id. at 445. 
50. Id. at 433 (emphasis in original) (citing N.M. Stat. § 28–1–7(F)). 
51. Id. at 445.  
52. Elane Photography v. Willock, 296 P.3d 491 (N.M. 2012) (granting writ of certiorari).  
53. 2013-NMSC-040, No. 33, 687 (N.M. Aug. 22, 2013).  
 
                                                     
12 - Dolan Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  5:38 PM 
1128 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1119 
three reasons to affirm the judgment of the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals.54 First, the court found that “a commercial photography 
business that offers its services to the public, thereby increasing its 
visibility to potential clients, is subject to the antidiscrimination 
provisions of the [New Mexico Human Rights Act] and must serve 
same-sex couples on the same basis that it serves opposite-sex 
couples.”55 Second, the court held that the New Mexico Human Rights 
Act does not violate free speech guarantees “because the [New Mexico 
Human Rights Act] does not compel Elane Photography to either speak 
a government-mandated message or to publish the speech of another.”56 
Third, the court found that the New Mexico Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act was inapplicable in this case because the government 
was not a party.57 As of this writing, New Mexico has not legalized 
same-sex marriage, but this case aptly demonstrates the possibility of 
conflict between same-sex couples and those who have a religious 
opposition to same-sex marriage.58 
This issue is further highlighted by the path that same-sex marriage 
legalization has taken in Rhode Island. On January 3, 2013, legislation 
was introduced in the Rhode Island Legislature to legalize same-sex 
marriage.59 However, the proposal faced opposition from Catholic 
groups, and Bishop Thomas Tobin stated that it was “immoral and 
unnecessary” to push for same-sex marriage instead of civil unions, 
which had been legalized in Rhode Island in 2011.60 The Rhode Island 
House Judiciary Committee approved the legislation on January 22, 
2013, and the House passed the bill two days later.61 However, the fate 
54. Id.at *3. 
55. Id. at *4. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. See, e.g., With New Legal Challenge, Gay Marriage Debate in New Mexico Heats Up, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/with-new-legal-challenge-gay-
marriage-debate-in-new-mexico-heats-up.html?_r=0 (explaining that a “vigorous campaign” was 
under way in New Mexico to legalize same-sex marriage at the time). 
59. See H. 5015, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2013), available at 
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText13/HouseText13/H5015.pdf. See also Same-sex Marriage 
Bills Introduced in RI House and Senate, PROVIDENCE J. (Jan. 3, 2013, 4:58 PM), 
http://news.providencejournal.com/politics/2013/01/same-sex-marriage-bills-introduced-in-ri-
house-and-senate.html (explaining that lawmakers in the Rhode Island House and Senate introduced 
bills on January 3, 2013 to legalize same-sex marriage in Rhode Island). 
60. Providence Bishop Says Gay Marriage ‘Unnecessary,’ BOSTON.COM (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhode-island/2013/01/07/providence-bishop-says-gay-marriage-
unnecessary/JtoXYibZLRh3puJhmCAJkO/story.html. 
61. See R.I. House Committee Sends Same-sex Marriage Bill to House Floor, PROVIDENCE J. 
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of this legislation in Rhode Island remained uncertain because some 
religious groups remained concerned about the lack of religious-
exemption provisions.62 In January 2013, Rhode Island State Senator M. 
Teresa Pavia-Weed reported that several Rhode Island senators wanted 
more expansive religious exemption protections to help shield religious 
leaders, charities, churches, and organizations that do not support same-
sex marriage from lawsuits.63 The final same-sex marriage bill in Rhode 
Island included a religious exemption for clergy members, which helped 
assuage concerns from lawmakers that religious leaders could be sued 
for abiding by their religious convictions.64 On May 2, 2013, Rhode 
Island became the tenth state to legalize same-sex marriage.65 
III.  WASHINGTON STATE HAS A LONG AND COMPLICATED 
PAST WITH SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
The process of legalizing same-sex marriage in any state can be a 
difficult and contentious journey, and Washington’s journey towards 
legalizing same-sex marriage is no exception. Washington entered into 
the same-sex marriage debate long before most states’ courts had begun 
to consider same-sex marriage issues with the Washington Court of 
Appeals’ 1974 decision in Singer v. Hara.66 In Singer, two gay activists 
requested a marriage license from King County, which denied the 
request.67 The activists then brought suit, alleging that the denial 
violated the Equal Rights Amendment of the Washington State 
Constitution.68 The court denied Singer’s claim, framing its decision in 
language that left no doubt as to the court’s position: 
The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, 
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children 
within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis . . . . This 
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://news.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2013/01/house-committee-sends-
same-sex-marriage-bill-to-house-floor.html. 
62. Rhode Island Gay Marriage Bill Faces Uncertain Future, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013, 
1:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/25/rhode-island-gay-marriage_n_2549762.html. 
63. Id.  
64. See Substitute H.B. 5015, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2013), available at 
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/PublicLaws/law13/law13004.htm. 
65. See id. 
66. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (holding that the statutory 
prohibition in Washington against same-sex marriage did not violate the Washington State 
Constitution). 
67. Id. at 248, 522 P.2d at 1188.  
68. Id.  
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historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded than the 
asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal interests 
for which petitioners contend.69 
The Washington State Supreme Court did not grant review.70 
Questions regarding the right to same-sex marriage in Washington 
were not raised again until 2004 when the Washington State Supreme 
Court considered two similar cases in Andersen v. King County71 and 
Castle v. State.72 In both cases, same-sex couples challenged the 
constitutionality of Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act and 
Washington’s laws banning same-sex marriages.73 The cases were 
consolidated for review before the Washington State Supreme Court in 
Andersen v. King County74 in 2006. Finding against the plaintiffs and 
reversing the trial court, the Court held: 
Applying the current case law that governs our decision and the 
narrow issues on which the plaintiffs requested we rule, we hold 
that the plaintiffs have not established that the Washington State 
Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional under the state 
privileges and immunities clause, Article I, Section 12, the state 
due process clause, Article I, Section 3, the state constitution’s 
privacy provision, Article I, Section 7, or the state’s Equal 
Rights Amendment, Article XXXI, Section 1.75 
Although the Court did not find a judicial path to same-sex marriage 
legalization in Washington, the Court left open the opportunity that the 
legislature might decide otherwise, stating “[o]ur decision accords with 
the substantial weight of authority from courts considering similar 
constitutional claims. We see no reason . . . why the legislature or the 
people acting through the initiative process would be foreclosed from 
extending the right to marry to gay and lesbian couples in 
Washington.”76 
69. Id. at 264, 522 P.2d at 1197 (quotations omitted). 
70. Singer v. Hara, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974) (denying review of Singer, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 
P.2d 1187). 
71. Andersen v. Sims, No. 04–2–04964–4, slip op. (Wash. 2004). 
72. Castle v. State, No. 04–2–0061404, slip op. (Wash. 2004). 
73. See Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 8–9, 138 P.3d 963, 968 (2006) (holding that, 
under a rational basis standard of review, Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act was rationally 
related to the state’s interest, did not violate the state constitution’s equal protection clause, was not 
invalid as a violation of privacy interests protected by the state constitution, and did not violate the 
Equal Rights Amendment). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 53, 138 P.3d at 990. 
76. Id. at 8, 138 P.3d at 968.  
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In January 2007, the Washington Defense of Marriage Alliance filed 
Initiative 957 in an attempt to increase examination of the same-sex 
marriage question in Washington.77 Initiative 957 proposed that 
marriage be limited to heterosexual couples who were able to have 
children and that all other marriages should be “unrecognized.”78 
Proponents of I–957 acknowledged that the initiative was “absurd” and 
was merely designed to ignite discussion on the same-sex marriage 
issue.79 Initiative 957 was withdrawn by its sponsor before a final vote 
could occur.80 
In January 2012, the legalization of same-sex marriage in Washington 
moved forward when the Senate Government Operations, Tribal 
Relations, and Elections Committee approved Senate Bill 6239 to 
legalize same-sex marriage.81 The Washington State Senate approved 
Senate Bill 6239 on February 1, 2012.82 The legislation then passed to 
the House, which approved the bill on February 8, 2012.83 Governor 
Christine Gregoire signed the same-sex marriage bill into law on 
February 13, 2012.84 
While the law was slated to take effect ninety days after the end of the 
legislative session, opponents of same-sex marriage successfully blocked 
the law’s implementation by collecting enough signatures to place the 
77. I–957 Would Require Married Couples to Have Kids, KOMO NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013, 6:19 PM), 
http://www.komonews.com/news/local/5566451.html; see also Initiative 957, WASHINGTON 
SECRETARY OF ST., http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i957.pdf (last visited July 3, 
2013). 
78. See KOMO NEWS, supra note 77. 
79. Id.   
80. Proposed Initiatives to the People - 2007, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF ST., 
http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/people.aspx?y=2007 (last visited Aug. 26, 2013). 
81. See S.B. 6239, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/6239.pdf. See also 
Same-sex marriage bill passes in Senate committee, CAPITOL REC. (Jan. 26, 2012), 
http://capitolrecord.tvw.org/2012/01/same-sex-marriage-bill-passes-in-senate-
committee/#.UScJvzCR8r8 (explaining that the Senate Government, Operations, Tribal Relations & 
Elections committee approved a bill to legalize same-sex marriage in Washington in January 2012). 
82. Washington Gay Marriage: State Senate Approves Bill To Allow Same-sex Couples To Wed, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2012, 11:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/ 
washington-gay-marriage_n_1248801.html.  
83. Washington State Legislature Votes to Approve Same-sex Marriage, CNN NEWS (Feb. 9, 
2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/08/us/washington-same-sex-marriage/index.html. 
84. See Engrossed Substitute S.B. 6239, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6239-
S.SL.pdf; see also REUTERS, supra note 1 (stating that Washington’s Governor Christine Gregoire 
signed Washington’s same-sex marriage bill into law on February 13, 2012).  
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measure on the ballot in November 2012 as Referendum 74.85 
Referendum 74 was ultimately approved, with 53.7% voting for and 
46.3% voting against the measure.86 On December 6, 2012, Washington 
issued its first same-sex marriage licenses.87 
Almost immediately, conflict began to surface in Washington 
between same-sex couples seeking wedding services and wedding 
service providers with strong religious objections to same-sex 
marriage.88 In one of the first such high-profile cases, a Richland florist 
declined to provide flowers for a same-sex wedding, providing her 
religious beliefs about same-sex marriage as the reason.89 Citing 
Washington’s antidiscrimination law,90 both the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the Washington State Attorney General’s Office 
filed suit against Arlene’s Flowers and its proprietor.91 The proprietor 
countersued against the Washington Attorney General’s office, arguing 
that the Attorney General was attempting to force her to act in a manner 
contrary to her religious convictions in violation of her constitutional 
rights.92 Opponents of same-sex marriage have used this case as a 
rallying cry and an example of the threat that looms over religious 
objectors to same-sex marriage.93 If no further steps are taken, this case 
is in all likelihood the first of many that will attempt to litigate these 
same issues. 
85. Anti-gay Marriage Measure Qualifies for Wash. State Ballot, USA TODAY (June 12, 2012, 
8:56 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2012/06/anti-gay-marriage-
measure-qualifies-for-wash-state-ballot/1#.UScM-TCR8r9.  
86. 2012 Washington State Election Results, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://seattletimes.com/flatpages/politics/2012-washington-election-results.html. 
87. Washington Starts Issuing Same-sex Marriage Licenses, CNN NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 2:32 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/05/us/washington-same-sex-marriage.  
88. State’s Case Against Florist Fires Up Gay-marriage Critics, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 18, 2013, 
10:36 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020803087_weddingflowersxml.html. 
89. Id.  
90. WASH. REV. CODE. § 49.60.215 (2010).  
91. Washington State and the ACLU Sue Florist for Refusing to Sell Flowers for Gay Wedding 
Because of Christian Beliefs, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Apr. 18, 2013, 8:58 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/flower-shop-sued-shunning-gay-wedding-article-
1.1321259.  
92. Richland Florist Sues State for Violating Her Religious Freedom, TRI-CITY HERALD (May 
16, 2013), http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2013/05/16/2397325/richland-florist-sues-state-for.html.  
93. See SEATTLE TIMES, supra note 88. 
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IV.  RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IS RECOGNIZED FEDERALLY AND 
IN WASHINGTON AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
DESERVING STRONG PROTECTIONS 
Litigation concerning wedding service providers’ obligation to serve 
same-sex couples has already begun and will likely continue as more 
same-sex couples are married.94 For those with strong feelings on the 
issue of same-sex marriage, the stakes are similar to the political and 
social debates over abortion rights that began decades ago and continue 
still today.95 However, this issue need not devolve into an ideological 
struggle that pits those in favor of same-sex marriage against those 
opposed to it in a destructive war of words and costly litigation. It is of 
paramount importance that the state government find a way to make 
both sides in this debate feel that they are being heard, that their needs 
are being addressed, and that they can be confident in the exercise of 
their beliefs in an open and reasonable manner without fear of reprisal, 
discrimination, or litigation. 
A.  The United States Has a Strong History of Protecting Religious 
Freedom 
Religious freedom in the United States is protected both by state 
constitutions and statutes and the First Amendment to the Constitution, 
which provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”96 
However, freedom of religion in the United States is not absolute, and it 
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that while laws 
generally cannot interfere with an individual’s religious belief and 
opinions, they may interfere with religious practices that may endanger 
others.97 For example, religions may not engage in practices such as 
human sacrifice or religiously-sanctioned murder, even if it is mandated 
by their religious “beliefs.”98 
When governments pass laws and ordinances that affect religious 
activity, they must do so in a manner that is of general applicability and 
94. See discussion, supra Part III (referencing examples of pending litigation between same-sex 
couples and wedding service providers with religious objections to same-sex marriage). 
95. See Turley, supra note 6, at 59. 
96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
97. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (posing extreme hypothetical 
situations to make the point that government must sometimes intervene to override certain 
dangerous religious practices). 
98. Id.  
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which advances a substantial government interest in order to justify the 
impact on religious activity.99 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah,100 the Court analyzed whether the City of Hialeah had 
improperly targeted a religion that engaged in the practice of animal 
sacrifices by passing an ordinance that forbade the killing of animals in a 
public or private ritual or ceremony.101 The Court stated that, 
“[l]egislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed 
to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.”102 Furthermore, “[t]he 
First Amendment right to free speech necessarily protects any speech, no 
matter how trivial. The First Amendment right to free exercise 
necessarily protects (within the limits of current Supreme Court 
doctrine) any religious belief, no matter how trivial.”103 
While decisions in cases like Lukumi Babalu make it clear that 
religious beliefs are much more easily protected than religious practices, 
it is not always clear how the court should weigh religious practices 
when they burden the rights of other groups in society.104 Nevertheless, 
religious freedom is a fundamental and longstanding right in the United 
States, and one that courts and legislatures should consider very 
carefully when weighing the legalization of same-sex marriage.105 
B.  Washington’s Constitution Contains Even Stronger Religious 
Freedom Protections than the Federal Constitution 
The religious freedom protections in the Washington State 
Constitution are generally seen as even stronger than those found in the 
Federal Bill of Rights.106 Washington also has a long history of 
99. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
100. Id.  
101. Id. at 523–25. 
102. Id. at 547.  
103. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 123, 140 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
104. See Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 547 (noting that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause commits 
government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state 
intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to 
remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.”). 
105. Id.  
106. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 224, 840 
P.2d 174 (1992) (noting that “Our state [constitutional] provision ‘absolutely’ protects freedom of 
worship and bars conduct that merely disturbs another on the basis of religion.”); see also Stormans 
Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (holding that forcing pharmacists to 
deliver emergency Plan B contraceptives despite their sincerely-held religious beliefs violated the 
free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  
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extending strong protections to the free exercise of religion.107 
Furthermore, while the Federal Constitution protects only the exercise of 
religion, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that the State 
Constitution can protect both freedom of belief and conduct.108 
Washington’s State Constitution guarantees that: 
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious 
sentiment, belief, and worship, shall be granted to every 
individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person 
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience 
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
and safety of the state.109 
Therefore, the Washington Constitution guarantees “[a]bsolute freedom 
of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment” subject only to the 
qualification that this not be construed to excuse licentious conduct or 
justify practices that would be contrary to public policy.110 
In addition to freedom of conscience protections, Washington’s courts 
have interpreted the extent of Article 1, Section 11’s religious freedom 
protections on multiple occasions.111 Generally, there are three 
prerequisites that must be met for a successful free exercise challenge.112 
The first prerequisite to any free exercise challenge under the 
Washington State Constitution is whether the parties have “a sincere 
religious belief.”113 To meet this requirement, an individual need only 
prove that his or her religious conviction is “sincere and central to their 
beliefs.”114 Once sincerity is “proven,” the court will not inquire further 
into the “truth” or “reasonableness” of the individual’s convictions.115 
107. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d at 225–26, 840 P.2d at 187.  
108. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 37 (2nd. 
ed. 2013). 
109. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.  
110. Id.  
111. See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d at 224–25, 840 P.2d at 186–87. 
112. Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 143, 152, 995 P.2d 33, 38–39 
(2000) (holding that requiring a church to apply for a conditional use permit or cease its business 
activities did not place an impermissible burden on the free exercise of religion). 
113. Id. (quoting Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 930 P.2d 318 (1997) (holding that the 
city’s demolition permit ordinance, which had the potential to delay a Catholic bishop’s plans to 
demolish school building to construct a pastoral center, violated the church’s right of free exercise 
of religion as guaranteed by the Washington State Constitution)). 
114. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321 (quoting Backlund v. Board of Comm’rs, 106 
Wash. 2d 632, 639, 724 P.2d 981 (1986)).  
115. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 199, 930 P.2d at 321. 
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The second threshold for a religious freedom analysis is whether the 
challenged enactment or action is a “burden” on the free exercise of 
religion.116 Generally, if the coercive effect of an enactment is to operate 
against a party in the practice of his or her religion, then it unduly 
burdens the free exercise of religion.117 The Washington State Supreme 
Court has reasoned that “[a] facially neutral, even-handedly enforced 
statute that does not directly burden free exercise may, nonetheless, 
violate Article 1, Section 11, if it indirectly burdens the exercise of 
religion.”118 Thus, even an indirect burden on the freedom of religion 
may be prohibited by Article 1, Section 11 of the Washington 
Constitution. 
The third threshold question for a religious freedom challenge in 
Washington is whether the burden on religion is offset by a compelling 
state interest.119 State action that might burden the exercise of a sincere 
religious belief is constitutional under Article 1, Section 11 only if the 
action has not resulted in the infringement of a citizen’s right to religious 
freedom, or if the burden on that citizen’s exercise of religion is justified 
by a “compelling state interest.”120 A “compelling state interest” is 
defined as one that has a “clear justification . . . in the necessities of 
national or community life.”121 Examples of compelling interests are 
those based “in the necessities of national or community life such as 
clear threats to public health, peace, and welfare.”122 Furthermore, to 
avoid a violation of religious freedom, the state must also demonstrate 
that the chosen means to achieve the compelling interests are necessary 
and that it is using the least restrictive means available to achieve its 
stated goal.123 
C.  Washington State’s Law Against Discrimination Conflicts with 
Religious Freedom Protections for Religious Objectors 
While Washington has strong protections for religious freedom, 
Washington also has several laws that prohibit public discrimination. 
116. Id. at 200, 930 P.2d at 321–22. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. (citing City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 7–8, 639 P.2d 
1358, 1362–63 (1982)).  
119. Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 200–01, 930 P.2d at 321–22. 
120. Id. at 199, 930 P.2d at 321. 
121. Id.  
122. Id.  
123. Id.  
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Washington’s primary anti-discrimination law is section 49.60.215 of 
the Revised Code of Washington, which states: 
It shall be an unfair practice for any person or the person’s agent 
or employee to commit an act which directly or indirectly results 
in any distinction, restriction, or discrimination . . . [on the basis] 
of race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, sex, 
honorably discharged veteran or military status, status as a 
mother breastfeeding her child, the presence of any sensory, 
mental, or physical disability . . . .124 
While homosexual individuals are not presently recognized as a true 
“protected class”125 under Washington law, section 49.60.215 does 
protect individuals in Washington from discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.126 Thus, same-sex marriage objectors’ right to 
exercise their religious beliefs can sometimes conflict with same-sex 
couples’ right to live their lives free from undue discrimination.127 
Some wedding service providers who oppose same-sex marriage 
argue that they should be able to exercise their religious beliefs in good 
faith by refusing to provide services to same-sex couples.128 Those in 
opposition to same-sex marriage for religious reasons are sometimes 
portrayed as bigots, and some have even gone so far as to draw 
comparisons with groups like the Ku Klux Klan.129 Yet some groups 
who are resistant to same-sex marriage on religious grounds feel that 
they must stand up for their beliefs, even if doing so offends others.130 
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2010).  
125. See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400−01 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing that 
classifications that disadvantage a quasi-suspect class, such as those who are homosexual, are 
subjected to a heightened standard of constitutional review and should be reviewed with 
intermediate scrutiny). A protected class is analogous to a “suspect class,” which the court, in 
Windsor, defined as a class having “a history of discrimination, an immutable characteristic upon 
which the classification is drawn, political powerlessness, and a lack of any relationship between the 
characteristic in question and the class’s ability to perform in or contribute to society.” Id. at 401. 
Despite this federal precedent, there is no comparable case law in Washington finding that 
homosexual persons are part of a “protected class.” See Andersen v. King Cnty., 158 Wash. 2d 1, 
67, 138 P.3d 963, 998 (2006) (the Supreme Court of Washington noted in a footnote that federal 
case law has reached different conclusions on the question of whether homosexuals constitute a 
protected class, but the Court failed to mention any such determination in Washington State).  
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2010). 
127. See Turley, supra note 6, at 60. 
128. See OREGON LIVE, supra note 14. 
129. See, e.g., Opponents of Gay Marriage Say They’re No Bigots, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Mar. 
25, 2013), http://www.religionnews.com/2013/03/25/opponents-of-gay-marriage-say-theyre-no-
bigots/ (explaining that opponents of gay marriage have been portrayed by others as “bigots” and 
“likened to the racists and the sexists of yesteryear”). 
130. Id.  
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All in all, it is likely that those who support same-sex marriage have 
downplayed the potential impact of same-sex marriage laws on others’ 
religious practices, and those who seek a religious exemption for 
providing same-sex marriage services downplay the impact that such 
exemptions would have on same-sex couples.131 
D.  Wedding Service Providers’ Refusal to Serve Same-Sex Couples 
Fulfills All Requirements of a Free Exercise of Religion Claim 
The effect of Washington’s same-sex marriage law is, in some 
circumstances, to burden the free exercise of religion in violation of 
established legal doctrine in Washington. As discussed, the first element 
to a free exercise challenge is whether a sincerely held religious belief is 
at stake. With regard to same-sex marriage, there is little doubt that 
many people have deeply-held religious beliefs that prevent them from 
embracing same-sex marriage. The fact that many proponents of same-
sex marriage characterize those in opposition as bigots is perhaps not 
surprising, as there can be “a tendency on the gay-rights side to dismiss 
these feelings of moral responsibility on the religious side.”132 As 
Professor Douglas Laycock explained, “There is nothing unique, or even 
unusual, about traditional believers feeling personal moral responsibility 
if they facilitate, or help celebrate, what they consider to be a deeply 
immoral relationship.”133 
The first prong of the religious freedom test readily being met, the 
second threshold question is whether there is a burden on the free 
exercise of religion. While the burden on the actual exercise of religion 
for those who have a religious opposition to same-sex marriage may not 
be evident at first, to the people holding such beliefs, the burden is real. 
It is not an appropriate role of the government to second-guess an 
individual’s stated beliefs and determine that the conduct in question is 
not a substantial burden on that person’s beliefs.134 Professor Chai R. 
Feldblum gives the example of an elderly Christian woman who 
sincerely believes that if she permits unmarried couples to rent and have 
extramarital sex in her rental units, she will be judged by God and will 
be unable to meet her deceased husband in the afterlife.135 Thus, an act 
131. See Feldblum, supra note 103, at 125. 
132. Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 195 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
133. Id. at 196.  
134. See Feldblum, supra note 103, at 144. 
135. Id. at 143. Professor Feldblum’s essay points out that a person in the elderly landlady’s 
 
                                                     
 
12 - Dolan Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  5:38 PM 
2013] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1139 
by the government compelling landlords to rent units to unmarried 
couples may constitute a burden on the practice of her beliefs and 
religion, even if the majority of people do not hold her same beliefs. 
Because of this, Professor Feldblum concludes that “we should err on 
the side of accepting the person’s allegation for purposes of deciding 
whether a burden on [belief] liberty exists.”136 
The Washington State Supreme Court in First Covenant Church137 
also recognized that legitimate burdens on religious freedom should not 
be considered trivial, noting that “[t]he possible loss of significant 
[historical] architectural elements is a price we must accept to guarantee 
the paramount right of religious freedom.”138 The Court also stated that 
“[o]ur state [constitutional] provision ‘absolutely’ protects freedom of 
worship and bars conduct that merely ‘disturbs’ another on the basis of 
religion. Any action that is not licentious or inconsistent with the ‘peace 
and safety’ of the state is ‘guaranteed’ protection.”139 Furthermore, the 
Court has stated that only dangers which are “clear and present, grave 
and immediate” justify an infringement on a person’s religious 
freedom.140 The Court also noted that religious freedom is “vital,” and 
that it is the “most important dut[y] of our courts to ever 
guard . . . religious liberty, and to see to it that these guarantees are not 
narrowed or restricted because of some supposed emergent situation.”141 
For wedding service providers with religious objections to same-sex 
marriage, being forced to provide wedding services despite their 
sincerely held moral qualms constitutes a burden on their religious 
freedom of the kind forbidden in First Covenant Church,142 Holcomb v. 
Armstrong,143 and Bolling v. Superior Court.144 
situation could also choose to take up a different occupation and thus, in a sense, creates this sort of 
conflict of her own volition. While this argument may have some merit, it fails to address the 
ultimate problem because it merely skirts around it. Even with such a solution, one is still left with a 
significant burden on religious liberty for the person who must choose a different line of work to 
avoid the conflict, because he or she must choose between their economic livelihood and their 
sincere religious beliefs. Professor Feldblum and this Comment argue that, as much as possible, we 
should strive not to put anyone in such a position. Id. at 144. 
136. Id.  
137. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d. 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992). 
138. Id. at 223, 840 P.2d at 185 (emphasis added). 
139. Id. at 224, 840 P.2d at 186.  
140. Id. at 225, 840 P.2d at 186–87 (quoting Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 
P.2d 545 (1952)).  
141. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d at 225, 840 P.2d at 186–87 (citing Bolling 
v. Superior Court, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 381, 385, 133 P.2d 803, 807 (1943)).  
142. First Covenant Church of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d at 224–25, 840 P.2d at 185–87. 
143. Holcomb, 39 Wash. 2d at 864, 239 P.2d 548.  
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The burden on religious objectors to same-sex marriage is evident in a 
more practical sense as well. Wedding service providers who refuse to 
provide those services to same-sex couples based on their religious 
beliefs do so with the knowledge that they will lose the business of that 
couple, likely other same-sex couples in the future, and perhaps even 
other people who support same-sex marriage rights.145 Indeed, it is not 
difficult to imagine that such businesses risk being boycotted by 
members of the general public who strongly disagree with their 
beliefs.146 
The first two prongs of the Washington religious freedom test being 
met, the third consideration is whether the burden of the law in question 
is offset by a compelling government interest. In determining whether a 
government’s interest is in fact compelling, “it is useful to look first at 
the importance of the value underlying the regulation, and second, at the 
degree of proximity and necessity that the chosen regulation bears to the 
underlying value.”147 In this case, the government does have an 
important interest in protecting same-sex couples from discrimination on 
the basis of their sexual orientation.148 However, the government also 
has a compelling and long-established interest in providing strong 
protections for religious freedom and freedom of conscience.149 
Religious freedom is the very first right that is guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,150 and it likewise occupies a 
prominent place in Article I, Section 11 of the Washington State 
Constitution.151 Furthermore, allowing private lawsuits against wedding 
service providers who have a religious objection to serving same-sex 
couples may not best serve the state’s interests. Perhaps the best 
resolution to this problem lies in a legislative accommodation that 
144. Bolling, 16 Wash. 2d at 381, 133 P.2d at 807. 
145. See, e.g., Slew of online hate reviews plagues ‘Sweet Cakes’ bakery, KATU.COM (Apr. 26, 
2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.katu.com/news/local/Slew-of-online-hate-reviews-plague-Sweet-
Cakes-190072751.html (noting that the Sweet Cakes Bakery in Gresham, Oregon that refused to 
bake a cake for a lesbian wedding simultaneously received a plethora of negative Yelp reviews 
online but also an increase in business from local supporters). 
146. See id.  
147. Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Donald A. Giannella, 
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part I. the Religious Liberty 
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967)).  
148. See discussion, supra Part IV.C (detailing the anti-discrimination protections afforded by 
Washington law).  
149. See discussion, supra Part IV.B (explaining the general importance of religious freedom in 
the Washington State Constitution and common law).  
150. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
151. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
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carefully crafts a balance between the rights of same-sex couples and 
wedding service providers.152 Such a solution would also serve the 
interests of judicial efficiency by forestalling the litigation that is 
currently pending in the courts and preventing litigation on the same 
issue in the future.153 
While the issue at hand has all of the elements of a freedom of 
religion claim, the right to freedom of conscience is also at stake. Article 
I, Section 11 of the Washington Constitution guarantees the absolute 
freedom of conscience, subject to public policy limitations,154 and 
wedding service providers who oppose same-sex marriage believe that 
this is a matter of conscience. For example, parties in opposition to 
claims of religious freedom have viewed the decision that confronts 
people of faith in the contraception context as “minor, even quaint, 
burdens on religious practices like regulations on facial hair, dreadlocks, 
drug use, land use regulation, taxation, and the like.”155 It is not a court’s 
purpose to evaluate the relative merits of differing religious beliefs, nor 
is it a court’s duty to evaluate the centrality of particular beliefs to a 
faith.156 Whether the conscientious objection is towards same-sex 
marriage or analogous issues such as abortion,157 emergency 
contraceptives,158 or being compelled to wield deadly weapons in 
defense of the state,159 the freedom of conscience is a fundamental right 
deserving of strong protections. 
When two fundamental and important rights collide with one another, 
the government must decide how to best protect its citizens. In this 
instance, “[s]tates, of course, have two [choices]: take the win-lose 
approach, and elevate the interests of one private party over another; or 
do nothing. Of these, the worst result would be to do nothing given the 
152. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065 (1995). Here, in the health care context, the 
Washington State Legislature established a statutory conscientious objection provision for health 
care providers who object to specific services for reasons of conscience or religion. In a similar 
way, the legislature could provide statutory protections to wedding service providers who have a 
religious opposition to same-sex marriage.  
153. See discussion, supra note 91. 
154. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; see also discussion of Article I, Section 11 of the Washington 
State Constitution, supra Part IV.B (explaining the importance of religious freedom protections 
guaranteed by the Washington State Constitution). 
155. Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
156. Id. 
157. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (discussing that the right of conscience in the 
abortion context has been recognized as constitutionally permissible).  
158. Stormans, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. 
159. WASH. CONST. art. X, sec. 6 (providing that no person having conscientious scruples against 
bearing arms shall be compelled to do militia duty during times of peace). 
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looming tide of litigation.”160 Given that doing nothing is not an 
attractive option, states must instead seek to mitigate, as much as 
possible, the impact of a “win-lose approach” between same-sex couples 
and wedding service providers.161 With this “looming tide of 
litigation”162 in mind, this Comment argues that Washington should 
adopt a “live-and-let-live”163 approach to this question, adopting a 
“refuse and refer” standard that allows wedding service providers to 
refuse service to same-sex couples in limited circumstances.164 
V.  A FEDERAL COURT IN WASHINGTON SIDED WITH 
PHARMACISTS WHO VOICED RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS TO 
SELLING EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVES 
While conflicts between Washington wedding service providers and 
same-sex couples have not yet received definitive judicial rulings, a 
federal court in Washington has addressed an analogous issue in the 
context of pharmacists’ rights and religious objections.165 This is 
significant because it illustrates that the freedom of religion is a 
fundamental right deserving of protection, and furthermore that a 
balance of rights can in fact be struck between conflicting parties. 
In Stormans Inc. v. Selecky,166 the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington considered the issue of whether the 
State could compel licensed pharmacists and pharmacies to dispense 
lawfully prescribed emergency contraceptives over the pharmacists’ 
sincere religious belief that “doing so terminates human life.”167 
Objecting pharmacists felt that they were being forced to choose 
between either violating these regulations or violating their religious 
belief that life begins at conception and that emergency contraceptives 
are thus immoral.168 
The plaintiffs in Stormans filed suit against the State, arguing that the 
law requiring pharmacies to stock and dispense emergency 
160. Robin F. Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the 
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 77, 
102 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 101. 
164. See id. 
165. See generally Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  
166. Id.  
167. Id. at 1175. 
168. Id. at 1175–76.  
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contraceptives violated their religious freedom in a manner prohibited by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah.169 In Lukumi Babalu, the Supreme Court held that 
non-neutral city ordinances that were not of general applicability 
adversely targeted religious activity.170 In the same way, the Stormans 
plaintiffs argued that the State’s regulations were unfairly trying to force 
pharmacists to perform services that they had a religious objection to 
providing, effectively forcing them to choose between their religious 
beliefs and their economic livelihood.171 
The State argued that the requirements for pharmacists were valid 
because they applied neutrally to medicines and pharmacies and 
promoted a governmental interest in the timely delivery of medicine, 
which was similar to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of religious 
freedom in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith.172 In Smith,173 the Supreme Court held that the free 
exercise clause did not prohibit the application of Oregon’s drug laws to 
the ceremonial use of peyote, thus allowing the State to deny claimants’ 
unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct based on the 
use of the drug.174 In deciding these issues in the context of emergency 
contraceptives, the court had to decide whether the facts in Stormans 
bore more resemblance to those in Lukumi Babalu or Smith.175 
After weighing these arguments, the court sided with the plaintiffs.176 
The court held that requiring pharmacists, despite their sincerely-held 
religious beliefs, to deliver all lawfully prescribed medications, 
including emergency contraceptives, violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental 
right to the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.177 The court 
169. Id. at 1187. 
170. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993) (holding that city ordinances banning animal sacrifices in public were not neutral or of 
general applicability and that the state’s interests did not justify the targeting of religious activity).  
171. Stormans, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.  
172. Id. at 1187 (noting that Smith illustrates a law that burdens religious conduct but is 
nonetheless constitutionally permissible because it is neutral and of general applicability, an 
argument which the State tried to apply in Stormans).  
173. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
174. See generally id. (holding that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment did not 
prohibit the application of Oregon’s drug laws to the ceremonial use of peyote, and therefore 
Oregon could deny claimants’ unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct based on 
the use of peyote).  
175. Stormans, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.  
176. Id. at 1201.  
177. Id. at 1200.  
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explained, “[p]ermitting pharmacies to refuse and refer for religious 
reasons does not create any greater difficulties in terms of patient access 
than permitting pharmacies to refuse and refer for secular reasons.”178 
The court found that the regulations were designed to force religious 
objectors to dispense emergency contraceptives, and that they sought to 
do so despite the fact that refusals for secular reasons were permitted.179 
In a similar manner, a balance could be struck that protects same-sex 
couples and also recognizes the religious objections of wedding service 
providers. To address these issues, the legislature could craft a religious 
exemption provision, similar to that for pharmacists, that allows 
wedding service providers who have a religious objection to same-sex 
marriage to refuse to provide services to same-sex couples and instead 
refer the customer to another provider in the community. Such a 
religious exemption would contain important exceptions to help protect 
the dignitary interests of same-sex couples in addition to the free 
exercise rights of objecting providers. In crafting such an exception, the 
legislature could avoid future litigation in favor of a more preemptive 
solution to these issues. 
VI.  THE “REFUSE AND REFER” BALANCING TEST IS THE 
BEST SOLUTION TO BALANCE COMPETING RIGHTS 
Crafting a test to balance fundamentally competing rights is 
inherently an extremely difficult venture, and “[l]egislatures will likely 
have to tease out on a case-by-case basis how the state will want to 
approach various refusals.”180 That being said, “[w]ith some predictable 
disputes, such as those over reception halls and bakeries, it is difficult to 
imagine dire consequences flowing from the refusal of a particular 
facility or bakery.”181 This is not to downplay the inconvenience or 
embarrassment that same-sex couples may experience; rather it is simply 
an attempt to balance inherently competing interests. Ultimately: 
[T]he right to one’s own moral integrity should generally trump 
the inconvenience of having to get the same service from 
another provider nearby. Requiring a merchant to perform 
services that violate his deeply held moral commitments is far 
more serious, different in kind and not just in degree, from mere 
178. Id. at 1189.  
179. Id. at 1201.  
180. See Wilson, supra note 160, at 100.  
181. Id.  
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inconvenience.182 
The wedding services industry employs many different types of 
providers, including printers, tailors, dressmakers, photographers, 
florists, caterers, bridal shops, and wedding registries, any of which 
could reasonably seek to refuse to provide these services for same-sex 
couples on religious grounds.183 
There is likely no perfect solution to this issue. Favoring either same-
sex couples or religious objectors creates serious issues for one side or 
the other. This being the case, “[p]erhaps the best we can hope for is to 
create statutorily a live-and-let-live solution, one that provides the ability 
to refuse based on religious or moral objections, but limits that refusal to 
instances where a significant hardship to the requesting parties will not 
occur.”184 While this solution means that protecting either wedding 
service providers or same-sex couples could necessarily come at the 
expense of one or the other in rare situations where there are real barriers 
to the access of wedding services and there is no alterative available to 
the same sex couple, it is nonetheless the best solution that will, in the 
vast majority of circumstances, allow both parties to live out their deeply 
held beliefs about marriage.185 
Although solutions that balance rights inevitably leave at least one 
side of a conflict unsatisfied, such is the nature of compromise. The 
health care controversy over the availability of emergency 
contraceptives in Washington is an excellent example186 of how 
Washington courts have found a way to resolve clashes between those 
who want a service and those who have a moral objection to providing 
it.187 Because there is no perfect solution to such problems, perhaps the 
best solution is one that crafts a religious exemption for those with moral 
objections to performing the services in question and yet still protects 
those seeking the services. 
This Comment recommends that the “live-and-let-live” solution, also 
known as the “refuse and refer” method, should have five important 
limitations to help protect the rights of same-sex couples seeking 
182. Laycock, supra note 132, at 198.  
183. Id. at 194.  
184. See Wilson, supra note 160, at 101.  
185. Id. at 94.  
186. See, e.g., Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (holding that 
forcing pharmacists to deliver emergency Plan B contraceptives despite their sincerely-held 
religious beliefs violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
187. See health care discussion, supra Part V.  
 
                                                     
12 - Dolan Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013  5:38 PM 
1146 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1119 
wedding services. First, only wedding service providers who personally 
provide wedding services to same-sex couples should be able to claim a 
religious exemption. One can easily imagine a slippery slope where a 
religious objection could be claimed by not only the wedding cake 
baker, but also the farmer harvesting the wheat, the mill processing the 
wheat into flour, and the deliveryman delivering the flour to the 
bakery.188 Under the proposed test, the baker with a religious objection 
to same-sex marriage may be able to claim a religious exemption to 
providing wedding services, but the other workers in the chain of cake-
baking commerce most likely would not. 
Second, there should be limitations on the size of the company that 
could claim a religious objection. Generally, those seeking to claim a 
religious objection would be limited to small service providers, as 
“[t]ruly commercial enterprises owned by individuals with religious 
objections to serving same-sex couples will not succeed in challenging 
the applicability of public accommodation laws.”189 Furthermore, larger 
businesses are more likely to be able to find someone who is willing to 
provide services to same-sex couples, even if some of the workers within 
the business are not. Thus far, most of the issues between wedding 
service providers and same-sex couples have occurred when the 
providers are small business owners who personally have a religiously-
grounded objection to same-sex marriage. This is the type of business 
that those who support religious freedom in the context of same-sex 
marriage feel is unfairly targeted by the current same-sex marriage law 
in Washington. Providing a limited religious exemption to small 
businesses with ten or fewer employees would undoubtedly help address 
the concerns of such critics and, in so doing, help usher in a more 
general acceptance for same-sex marriages. 
The third requirement of the “refuse and refer” method would 
mandate that a wedding service provider seeking to avoid providing 
wedding services to same-sex couples based on his or her religious 
objections must openly advertise that fact. This would help alleviate the 
“surprise” problem that has so far been at the root of many of the issues 
between same-sex couples and objecting wedding service providers. For 
example, in the case of the Richland, Washington florist that refused to 
provide flower services for a same-sex wedding, the spurned couple was 
quoted as saying that the rejection “really hurt”190 because the florist in 
188. See Wilson, supra note 160, at 92. 
189. Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1, 37 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
190. Barronelle Stutzman, Washington Florist Who Rejected Gay Couple, Faces Lawsuit from 
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question “does amazing work” and the couple in question had been 
looking forward to using her flowers in their wedding because they had 
used her store many times in the past.191 For many same-sex couples, the 
surprise, embarrassment, and insult of going into a bakery, florist’s shop, 
or photographer’s studio and being turned away because of their sexual 
orientation is more frustrating and painful than the actual effort required 
to find a replacement service provider. 
The advertising requirement is further strengthened by the simple 
truth that it will make a wedding service provider’s opposition to same-
sex marriage known publicly. It is not difficult to imagine that any 
business advertising that it will not serve same-sex couples will face a 
loss of business from both same-sex couples and others who support 
same-sex marriage. This adverse economic impact will help ensure that 
only those wedding service providers who hold sincere religious 
objections to same-sex marriage will claim the exemption, as they must 
be willing to bear the cost of refusing to provide services for same-sex 
weddings. Therefore, any wedding service provider that has a religious 
objection to performing services for same-sex marriages must advertise 
that objection in a tasteful and respectful manner, using their standard 
method of advertising. These advertisements could be located in 
storefront windows, in printed advertisement materials, or on a website. 
A potential issue with the third prong of this test is the risk that 
allowing wedding service providers to choose what types of customers 
they will and will not serve will give rise to the same sorts of 
discrimination, both racial and otherwise, that have been endemic in the 
United States throughout its history. While such concerns are valid, 
religious exemptions to the same-sex marriage issue can be 
distinguished in several ways. Professor Robin F. Wilson argues: 
While the parallels between racial discrimination and 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should not be 
dismissed, it is not clear that the two are equivalent in this 
context. The religious and moral convictions that motivate 
objectors to refuse to facilitate same-sex marriage simply cannot 
be marshaled to justify racial discrimination.192 
Additionally, whereas the Constitution ascribes no value to 
discrimination on the basis of race, discrimination on the basis of 
State Attorney General, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2013, 2:14 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/barronelle-stutzman-washington-florist-lawsuit-
_n_3052301.html.  
191. Id.  
192. See Wilson, supra note 160, at 101. 
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religion oftentimes stems from the constitutionally protected right to the 
free exercise of religion.193 The Supreme Court has explained that the 
Constitution “places no value on discrimination as it does on the values 
inherent in the Free Exercise Clause.”194 The Court has also noted that 
“[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of 
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but 
it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections”195 in 
the way that religious freedom has. This is not to say that religious 
freedom should outweigh the right to be free from discrimination, but 
merely that the Constitution explicitly recognizes an affirmative right to 
religious freedom, whereas the freedom to discriminate is not a right 
afforded the same value by the Constitution. 
While some critics may argue that allowing wedding providers to 
refuse to serve same-sex couples based on religious objections is 
essentially akin to conduct that has been found unconstitutional in 
decisions like Bob Jones v. United States,196 the conduct of wedding 
service providers can be distinguished. In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court 
found that nonprofit private schools that enforced racially discriminatory 
admission standards on the basis of religious doctrine could not receive 
tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code.197 However, the 
extension from racial discrimination to discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation should not be assumed, as, “the Court’s description in 
Bob Jones of the ‘consistent’ efforts to eliminate racial discrimination—
even by military force—has no counterpart with same-sex marriage. 
[Additionally], the Court found [the discrimination in] Bob Jones to lack 
all public benefit insofar as it was in violation of ‘fundamental’ public 
policy.”198 In the context of same-sex marriage, there is a definite public 
benefit in balancing the rights of same-sex couples and the right to 
religious freedom for wedding service providers, as both rights are 
considered fundamental and deserve heightened protection.199 Indeed, it 
is difficult to imagine a more profound public benefit than the protection 
193. Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns 
Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 103, 
115 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
194. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (commenting on discrimination in the racial 
context and noting that the Constitution does not explicitly protect against such discrimination). 
195. Id. at 470.  
196. See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
197. Id.  
198. See Kmiec, supra note 193, at 110.  
199. See discussion of religious freedom in Washington, supra Part IV.B.  
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of religious freedom, a fundamental right protected by both the federal 
and state constitutions, and freedom from discrimination, a right 
guaranteed by Washington State law.200 
The Court in Bob Jones also found a common law public policy 
against racial discrimination in education, a public policy that has no 
counterpart in the context of same-sex marriage.201 The Supreme Court 
tackled issues of sexual orientation in its decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas.202 Professor Douglas W. Kmiec noted that “[t]he absence of 
common law support for same-sex marriage can be discerned in 
Lawrence v. Texas. Lawrence may have overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 
but that overruling could not revise the common law, which, even the 
Lawrence majority had to concede, did not affirmatively protect 
homosexual sodomy.”203 Instead, the Court in Lawrence simply decided 
that they would not be bound by common law or popular notions of 
morality.204 As such, while there is arguably a common law public 
policy against racial discrimination in education, there is, at least at 
present, no such comparable public policy in the context of same-sex 
marriage.205 
The fourth requirement that any wedding service provider seeking a 
religious exemption would have to meet is that there be no overt insults 
or what could be deemed hate speech made to a same-sex couple seeking 
wedding services. The point of providing religious exemption 
protections for wedding service providers with religious objections to 
same-sex marriage is to protect the free exercise of religion as 
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, not to give wedding 
service providers free reign to wantonly discriminate in a disrespectful 
manner against same-sex couples. This situation is not difficult to 
200. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2010) (Washington’s general anti-discrimination 
law). 
201. Kmiec, supra note 193, at 110. 
202. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–74 (2003) (holding that the Texas statute that made it 
a crime for two persons of the same gender to engage in certain intimate conduct violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
203. Kmiec, supra note 193, at 110 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; citing Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that Georgia’s sodomy statute did not violate the 
fundamental rights of homosexuals)). 
204. Id.; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (holding that the Texas statute that made it a crime 
for two persons of the same gender to engage in certain intimate conduct violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
205. This is not to say that there will never be a common law policy against discrimination in 
relation to same-sex marriage, but rather that at present no such policy has been developed. Only 
time will tell whether courts will create a comparable common law public policy against 
discrimination in the same-sex marriage context.  
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imagine, as “[t]he larger problem for same-sex couples is the insult, the 
pointed reminder that some fellow citizens vehemently disapprove of 
what they are doing. But same-sex couples know that anyway, and the 
American commitment to freedom of speech ensures that they will be 
reminded of it from time to time.”206 Because protecting the dignity of 
same-sex couples is extremely important, any wedding service provider 
claiming religious freedom reasons for refusing service must meet all of 
the requirements of the proposed test, including the requirement that any 
rejection not rise to the level of hate speech. Evaluating the subjective 
nature of a person’s language while rejecting a same-sex couple’s 
request for services is an inherently difficult activity, but such is the task 
that pluralistic societies must sometimes engage in to balance 
fundamentally competing interests. 
The fifth requirement under the proposed test is that wedding service 
providers who decline to provide services to same-sex couples on 
religious grounds would be required to refer same-sex couples to other 
providers of the same services in their community; namely providers 
who do not have the same moral qualms about serving same-sex 
couples. In effect, this would require wedding service providers with a 
religious objection to same-sex marriage to refer same-sex couples to 
their competition, directly causing the objectors to lose potential 
customers. In general, this requirement should not be unduly difficult, as 
many wedding service providers have no objections to providing 
services to same-sex couples, as evidenced by the show of support many 
same-sex couples have received after having been refused service on 
their first attempt at acquiring such services.207 
However, there will likely be instances where a town’s sole baker, 
photographer, or florist has a religious objection to same-sex marriage 
which prevents a same-sex couple from having access to such services at 
all. In such a case, the legislature could decide either that the same-sex 
couple is simply “out of luck,” or determine that the wedding service 
provider’s right to moral integrity is outweighed by the same-sex 
couples’ right to live in the community in accordance with their moral 
beliefs.208 In the end, this is a policy decision that the legislature must 
206. Laycock, supra note 132, at 198.  
207. For an example, see supra note 14, detailing how Food Network star chef Duff Goldman 
offered a free wedding cake to the couple that was refused service from the Sweet Cakes Bakery in 
Gresham, Oregon. This is perhaps not surprising, and shows that any wedding service provider that 
chooses to decline to serve same-sex couples must do so with the knowledge that he or she will 
undoubtedly lose business as a result. 
208. See Laycock, supra note 132, at 199.  
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decide on its own. Hopefully, the “live-and-let-live” solution will 
minimize the situations where determinations among competing rights 
are necessary, but there is little doubt that, on very rare occasions, these 
issues will arise even with this balancing test in place. In such a case, 
this Comment recommends that the right to live in accordance with a 
sincerely-held religious belief should outweigh a same-sex couple’s right 
to a particular wedding service. Simply put, the longstanding and 
fundamental right to freedom of religion should not be overridden to 
force, for example, a baker to bake a cake or a caterer to prepare food for 
a same-sex wedding, as living in accordance with one’s deeply-held 
religious beliefs should outweigh another’s inconvenience, as frustrating 
as that may be for the couple forced to find another comparable service 
provider. 
CONCLUSION 
When fundamental rights come into conflict, disagreements about 
how to handle those conflicts are sure to abound. In the context of same-
sex marriage, both same-sex couples and wedding service providers with 
religious objections to same-sex marriage seek to live in accordance with 
their deeply held beliefs about love, family, and marriage. In certain 
situations, these beliefs come into conflict and thus compromise is 
needed. By its very nature, compromise dictates that neither side is 
completely satisfied with the outcome, but such is the dilemma that we 
as a pluralistic society must sometimes confront. 
This Comment has proposed that the Washington Legislature 
implement five requirements that would allow wedding service 
providers with religious objections to same-sex marriage to refuse to 
provide wedding services to same-sex couples under a limited range of 
circumstances. First, only wedding service providers who are asked to 
perform a personal service for a same-sex couple could claim a religious 
exemption. Second, only very small businesses, generally sole 
proprietorships and providers with ten or fewer employees, would be 
granted a religious exemption. Third, any wedding service provider with 
a religious objection to providing services to same-sex couples would be 
required to openly advertise that fact. Fourth, the religious exemption 
would not excuse subjecting same-sex couples to hate speech and would 
seek to reduce, as much as possible, any dignitary effects suffered by a 
same-sex couple from such a refusal. Fifth, any wedding service 
provider refusing service to a same-sex couple for religious reasons 
would have to refer that couple to another similar service provider in the 
community. If none can be found, then the legislature would need to 
decide which interest outweighs the other in that situation, although this 
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Comment argues that in these situations religious freedom should 
outweigh the right to wedding services. 
Societal change is difficult and can be a painful experience for 
everyone involved. However, history shows that while change, such as 
the Civil Rights Movement, may be difficult, it is necessary as a 
pluralistic society advances and becomes more tolerant of others. In the 
case at hand, both sides in the same-sex marriage debate seek to promote 
their vision of freedom: religious freedom for some and the freedom to 
marry for others. As Professor Jonathan Turley noted: 
[T]he progress made toward same-sex marriage and homosexual 
rights is due in large part to the protection of free speech and 
associational rights. The rights of gay citizens will be secured 
not simply with legal but also with cultural changes. The latter 
will depend on greater, not lesser, protection of speech and 
association on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate.209 
As it stands now, the right to marry for same-sex couples arguably 
outweighs the right to religious freedom for religious objectors to same-
sex marriage in Washington State. The Washington Legislature has an 
unprecedented opportunity to legislate a balance of rights between same-
sex couples and wedding service providers with religious objections to 
same-sex marriage that will help stave off future conflicts surrounding 
this issue by crafting a compromise in the chambers of the House and 
Senate rather than in a courtroom. Regardless of future legislative or 
judicial action, the question remains whether marriage equality 
proponents, oftentimes self-described as the “champions of 
tolerance,”210 are themselves prepared to practice tolerance towards 
proponents of a different moral vision of marriage. 
APPENDIX A – SAMPLE LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE 
Subject to the limitations defined in this chapter, no individual 
wedding service provider may be required or compelled by law 
or contract in any circumstances to participate in the provision 
of a wedding service for a same-sex wedding if they object to 
doing so for reasons of conscience or religion. No person may 
face a civil lawsuit because of such a refusal. 
 
209. Turley, supra note 6, at 76. 
210. See Stern, supra note 189, at 57.  
 
                                                     
